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The paper compares behavior in economic dictator game experiments 
played with actual money (amounts given by "dictator" subjects) with 
behavior in hypothetical dictator game experiments where subjects indicate 
what they would give, although no money is actually exchanged. The 
average amounts transferred in the two experiments are remarkably 
similar. Moreover, we uncover meaningful individual differences in real 
and hypothetical allocations and demonstrate the importance of two 
personality traits - agreeableness and extraversion - in reconciling them. 
We conclude that extraverts are "all talk;" agreeable subjects are "for real." 
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Minnesota and the Economics Department, University of Haifa, ISRAEL. "The superior man is modest in his speech, but exceeds in his actions." 
- Confucius 
"I have long since come to believe that people never mean half of what they 
say, and that it is best to disregard their talk and judge only their actions" 
- Dorothy Day 
1. Introduction 
Economic experiments are usually carried out with actual money in 
the belief that subjects act truthfully only if their decisions and actions have 
actual rather than hypothetical financial consequences for them. Whether 
money is required to elicit subjects' preferences in experiments is an 
important practical question for experimenters. Indeed, financial incentives 
often fail to bring about a clear improvement in subjects' mean 
performance (Camerer and Hogarth (1999) survey the evidence). On the 
other hand, in studies with "Dictator Games," zero-sum, one-shot games, 
where subjects are invited to consider sharing a fixed endowment with 
another person who is entirely passive, incentives are claimed to affect (as 
opposed to "improve," since there is no accepted performance metric) 
behavior. In particular, when payments are real rather than hypothetical, 
subjects were found to act less generously, keeping more to themselves 
(Sefton (1992) and Forsythe et al. (1994)). 
This paper compares behavior in economic dictator game 
experiments played with actual money (amounts given by "dictator" 
subjects) with behavior in hypothetical dictator game experiments where 
subjects indicate what they would give, although they would not actually be 
asked to do so. Experimental subjects are allowed to split $10 with a 
person of known gender.
3 When we aggregate across recipients and 
compare the allocations made in the two experiments, we are unable to 
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  2find significant differences in subjects' generosity in the two experiments. 
Amounts given by the average subject do not depend on the presence of 
financial incentives. 
While the observation that average amounts sent in real and 
hypothetical experiments are statistically indistinguishable may be 
interesting, it potentially fails to recount the whole story since possible 
individual heterogeneity is ruled out by construction. In this paper, we 
challenge the commonly-made assumption of a fictitious "representative" 
subject, imposed by aggregating experimental data across subjects, and turn 
to investigate real and hypothetical allocations at the individual level. 
Despite the fact that allocations in the two experiments are on average 
identical, we document systematic individual differences in discrepancies 
between hypothetical and actual transfers of money. As part of the 
experiment, all subjects complete a self-report inventory measuring five 
major personality factors: neuroticism, extraversion, openness to 
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Based on information 
from these tests, observed gaps in real versus hypothetical transfers are 
successfully accounted for by this five-factor model of personality. So, while 
certain personality types tend to exaggerate their actual contributions when 
doing so is inconsequential financially, other types will understate it, doing 
more than just "putting their money where their mouths are."         
The study of incentive effects in dictator game experiments at the 
individual level and the possible relations to corresponding measurable 
personality types supplements recent empirical evidence on the 
importance of disaggregation across individuals. For example, it is argued 
that the significant variance in observed decision biases can be accounted 
for by various measures of cognitive ability (Stanovich (1999)). The 
question whether cognitive ability is (partly) "responsible" for affecting 
money allocation decisions when financial consequences are real rather 
  3than hypothetical is an empirical one. Since subjects complete a cognitive 
ability test as part of the experiment, we will be able to shed light on the 
role of sophistication in this particular setting (i.e., do more sophisticated 
subjects behave in a more socially desirable way when doing so is 
costless?). 
More closely related to the present study, Boone et al. (1999) 
document relationships between observed behavior in the "Prisoner's 
Dilemma" and four personality traits (locus of control, self-monitoring, 
type-A behavior, and sensation seeking). Personality characteristics also 
appear to play a role in the determination of optimal consumption levels in 
a dynamic setting (Brandstatter and Guth (2000)), shaping risk preferences 
(Lauriola and Levin (2001)), affecting the degree of trust and 
trustworthiness in "trust game" experiments (Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) 
and Burks et al. (2003)), determining individual sending behavior and 
degree of reciprocity in "dictator game" experiments (Ben-Ner, Kong, and 
Putterman (2004) and Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, and Magan (2004)), 
affecting the degree of overconfidence (Campbell et al. (2004)), influencing 
portfolio allocations between relatively risky and safe investment 
opportunities (Hunter and Kemp (2004)), and are responsible in part for 
observed variations in earnings in the labor market (Nyhus and Pons 
(2004)). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the 
conventional and hypothetical dictator game experiments. Section 3 
presents our analysis and results. Section 4 summarizes our findings and 
presents concluding remarks. 
  42. The Experiment 
2.1 Conventional Economic Dictator Game Experiments 
On two separate occasions, all freshmen at the University of 
Minnesota (approximately 5,000) were invited by e-mail to participate in 
economic-psychological experiments to take place on a Friday about one 
month after the beginning of the academic year. The e-mail invitations 
were issued individually (the identities of other recipients were not 
disclosed in the invitation), and requested their participation in an 
economics/psychology experiment that would last up to two hours, that 
would require no physical effort, that would assure subjects' anonymity, 
and that would earn them a $15 participation fee. On both occasions, 
nearly 10% of the students responded, and about half of those actually 
participated. The first set of experiments consisted of conventional 
economic dictator game experiments with $10 endowments of actual 
money. The invitation to this experiment mentioned that subjects may earn 
additional money. Part of this experiment was replicated at Brown 
University. The second set of experiments consisted of simulated dictator 
game experiments conducted with hypothetical $10 endowments (see 
below). 
In both experiments, subjects were also asked to complete a set of 
cognitive ability (Wonderlic) and personality (NEO five-factor inventory) 
tests. The Wonderlic personnel test is a timed, 50-item cognitive ability 
measure commonly used in the pre-employment selection context. 
Wonderlic scores are highly consistent with other well-recognized 
measures such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the General 
Aptitude Test Battery, and the Stanford Achievement Test (see, e.g., 
McKelvie (1989), Hawkins et al. (1990)). The NEO five-factor inventory 
(Briggs (1992)) is one of the leading psychological scoring systems which 
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"extraversion," "openness," "agreeableness," and "conscientiousness." 
The neuroticism factor "assesses adjustment vs. emotional instability. 
Identifies individuals prone to psychological distress, unrealistic ideas, 
excessive cravings or urges, and maladaptive coping responses." 
Characteristics of the high scorer on this factor include worrying, nervous, 
emotional, insecure, inadequate, and hypochodriacal. The extraversion 
factor "assesses quantity and intensity of interpersonal interaction; activity 
level; need for stimulation; and capacity for joy." Characteristics of the high 
scorer on this factor include sociable, active, talkative, person-oriented, 
optimistic, fun-loving, and affectionate. The openness factor "assesses 
proactive seeking and appreciation of experience for its own sake; 
toleration for and exploration of the unfamiliar." Characteristics of the high 
scorer on this factor include curious, broad interest, creative, original, 
imaginative, and untraditional. The agreeableness factor "assesses the 
quality of one's interpersonal orientation along a continuum from 
compassion to antagonism in thoughts, feelings, and actions." 
Characteristics of the high scorer on this factor include soft-hearted, good-
natured, trusting, helpful, forgiving, gullible, and straightforward. Finally, 
the conscientiousness factor "assesses the individual's degree of 
organization, persistence, and motivation in goal-directed behavior. 
Contrasts dependable, fastidious people with those who are lackadaisical 
and sloppy." Characteristics of the high scorer on this factor include 
organized, reliable, hardworking, self-disciplined, punctual, scrupulous, 
neat, ambitious, and persevering (Costa and McCrae (1992)). 
The conventional dictator game experiments were conducted at 
both Minnesota and Brown using identical protocols and the same 
experimental teams. These experiments were fashioned in a manner that 
closely follows the double-blind design of Hoffman et al. (1994) and Eckel 
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between subjects and experimenters. Appendix A contains the instructions 
given to dictators. Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004) and Ben-Ner, 
Putterman, Kong, and Magan (2004) describe the experiments in more 
detail. 
One-half of the subjects at each site were assigned to the role of 
dictator and the other half to the role of recipient. Dictators and recipients 
entered different rooms in separate buildings and were assured explicitly of 
their anonymity. In addition to the $15 participation fee, each participant 
in the dictator rooms was given an envelope that contained 10 slips of 
paper and 10 one dollar bills, mixed together - the slips being included so 
that sending decisions would take the same amount of time to implement, 
and the resulting envelopes would be of the same thickness, regardless of 
the amount sent. The decision on how much money and how many slips 
of paper to retain and to send was made at "privacy stations" fashioned so 
as to hide the subject from the knee up (thus providing complete privacy 
for transferring money or paper slips from envelopes to one's own 
pockets). The envelope containing the slips of paper and/or money was 
deposited by the subjects in a box. When all subjects completed their 
decisions, a room assistant brought the box with envelopes to counters who 
waited outside each room. In the presence of the room assistant, the 
counters registered the number of dollars included in the money envelope. 
Room assistants and counters transported the money envelopes to the 
appointed receiving room and gave them to the room assistant for 
distribution there. 
The written instructions given to dictators included information 
about their potential recipient. At Minnesota, 22 subjects were told that this 
person was a female, and 28 were told that this person was a male. At 
  7Brown, 22 subjects were told that this person was a female; because of the 
smaller sample size, the ‘male’ condition was not employed.
4  
 
2.2 Hypothetical Dictator Game Experiments 
    This experiment was conducted at the University of Minnesota, 
and was patterned closely after the conventional experiments described 
above. In this experiment, all subjects (220 of them) were assigned to the 
role of dictator, and were told to imagine that they were given $10 to divide 
between themselves and another person in increments of $1, by writing 
down how much they would give away and how much they would keep so 
that the total would be $10. The subjects were asked to imagine the 
situation to be as close as possible to a real-life situation, and were given 
assurances of anonymity. As in the previous experiments, subjects-dictators 
were given information about the hypothetical person to whom they 
considered giving hypothetical money. Of the 220 subjects, 20 were told 
that their potential recipient was a female. Appendix C contains the 
instructions to this experiment. 
    The majority of the subjects/dictators, 200 of them, participated in 
an experiment that consisted of 91 mini-experiments, insofar as subjects 
were asked to consider separately sharing the hypothetical $10 with 91 
different persons. The descriptions were presented in just a few words in a 
list in which the types of persons followed no particular order. The 
instructions to this experiment are i n c l u d e d  i n  A p p e n d i x  B .  O f  t h e s e  
hypothetical or imaginary persons that were described, this paper focuses 
on two characterizations, male and female (i.e., "giving to male" and "giving 
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  8to female"). All 220 subjects participated subsequently in additional 
experiments that do not bear on the subject matter of this paper, and 
completed the same instruments that were administered in the experiment 
with actual money. 
 
3. Analysis 
3.1 Summary Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 
In Table 1, we present summary statistics for both sets of 
experiments ("pay" and "no pay" for experiments with and without money, 
respectively) of the different variables used. In addition to information on 
amounts sent, we report raw scores dictators earned on NEO 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness 
scales, and raw scores earned on the Wonderlic personnel test on 
problem-solving ability.  
We combined the data from the two “pay” experiments in the 
giving-to-females condition at Minnesota and Brown; the average giving in 
the two experiments differs by $0.05, and tests comparing the two 
distributions justify the pooling. In the “no pay” experiments we combined 
the data for giving to females by the 200 subjects who participated in the 
experiment with multiple items with the data for the 20 subjects who gave 
to females in a single-item experiment; the difference in average giving is 
$0.11, and the pooling is supported by statistical tests.  
 
Table 1, Here 
 
Clearly, the average dictator is not acting less generously in our 
dataset when payments are real rather than hypothetical. On the contrary, 
the amounts sent slightly increase in experiments where real money is 
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$2.70 (SD of 2.89), it increases to $3.08 (SD of 2.52) when subjects 
allocate actual $10. These differences, however, are not economically or 
statistically significant. An Anova F-statistics test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal means at accepted significance levels. Equality of 
medians (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney) and variances (adjusted Bartlett 
statistic) cannot also be rejected. As expected, in an OLS regression of 
dollar amounts sent on a dummy variable (1 when choices are 
hypothetical, 0 otherwise), the estimated coefficient is negative but far from 
being significant (probability of 0.29). 
As previously mentioned, in dictator games where players are asked 
to divide $5, Forsythe et al. (1994) reject the "pay hypothesis," stating that 
the distributions of dictator allocations are identical with and without pay, 
in favor of the alternative that dictators are more generous when payments 
are hypothetical (they fail to reject the null, however, on the basis of 
experimental data collected in one of their two sessions). Our results show 
that the conclusion (based on aggregated data) that financial incentives in 
dictator games induce substitution away from behavior considered to be 
socially desirable is premature. Additional evidence is needed to assist in 
conclusively establishing the average effect of financial incentives on giving. 
The analysis thus far suggests that experimental dictators are neither 
more nor less selfish when asked to transfer part of a real rather than 
hypothetical endowment to another powerless subject. However, the 
evidence cited above documents substantial differences in individuals' 
behavior and decision-making processes and finds that these differences 
are associated with differences in cognitive ability and personality 
characteristics. As a result, any attempt at aggregating across subjects may 
be misleading. The next Subsection disaggregates the data by controlling 
for dictators' main personality traits, in addition to their cognitive ability. 
  10We are unaware of any attempt to study incentive effects at the individual 
level. 
 
3.2 Financial Incentives, Individual Differences, and Personality 
Types 
In this Subsection, we conduct an exploratory analysis of incentive 
effects in dictator game experiments at the level of the individual 
subject/dictator. Here, individuals differ on: 1) their cognitive ability – 
measured using the Wonderlic personnel test, and 2) their personality 
traits – based on scores in the NEO five-factor inventory. In essence, the 
statistical analysis we provide below questions whether the heterogeneous 
impact of monetary incentives on dictators' generosity can be reconciled by 
the corresponding differences in cognition scores and scores on the five 
personality factors. Estimates reported in Table 2 are based on both OLS 
and ordered logit estimation. The 200 subjects who participated in the 
multiple-item hypothetical giving experiments gave to both a female and a 
male. We follow scholars who work with data generated from multiple 
responses from the same subjects (e.g., Eckel and Grossman (2003)) and 
treat the two responses from each of the 200 subjects as panel data, with 




Table 2, Here 
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Kong, and Putterman (2004) for an elaboration on some of these empirical relations. 
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financial incentives - differences across experimental dictators in allocations 
of real and hypothetical dollars – are related to individual differences in 
personality but are independent of the dictator's gender and cognitive 
ability. More specifically, we find that these differences are related to 
dictators' scores on two of the five personality traits, agreeableness and 
extraversion. For the agreeableness variable, the coefficient of the 'no pay' 
dummy (1 for hypothetical allocations, 0 otherwise) is estimated to be 
negative (-0.214 and -0.134, in OLS and ordered logit estimation, 
respectively) and highly significant (probability of 0.3 percent in both 
cases). In the case of the extraversion variable, an opposite effect is 
documented. The coefficient of the 'no pay' dummy is estimated to be 
positive (0.244 and 0.158, in OLS and ordered logit estimation, 
respectively) and is different from zero at any probability level. 
Agreeable dictators (believed to be "fundamentally altruistic") – those 
who score high on the agreeableness personality scale – are found to 
downplay their actual contribution when their intentions are elicited; they 
send more when asked to divide real $10 than when the $10 are fictional. 
These agreeable individuals, who are characterized in the psychological 
literature by straightforwardness, trust, altruism, modesty, tender-
mindedness, and compliance (the six different facets defining 
agreeableness, Costa and McCrae (1992)) will be more generous towards 
recipients lacking any bargaining power when actions have monetary 
consequences (since amounts kept are added to their final experimental 
payoff). When hypothetically challenged, knowing that their actions have 
no real consequences for recipients, agreeable dictators will portray 
themselves as more self-centered, profit-maximizers  than what is 
subsequently revealed by their actions. They are modest in their speech, 
but exceed in their actions; they "walk the walk" but do not "talk the talk."  
  12Extravert dictators – those who score high on the extraversion 
personality scale – are in stark contrast talking the talk but not walking the 
walk; their stated intentions poorly predict their actual actions. These 
extravert individuals, who are characterized in the psychological literature 
by gregariousness, activity level, assertiveness, excitement-seeking, positive 
emotions, and warmth (the six different facets defining extraversion) will 
portray themselves as generous when generosity is costless. Alas, their 
actions fall short of intentions. When actions bear financial consequences, 
the generosity of extravert dictators will wane. In this respect, "they have too 
many high sounding words, and too few actions that correspond with them" 
(Abigail Adams).  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper looked into the possible effects of financial incentives in 
dictator game experiments. The limited evidence so far suggests that 
experimental dictators are less generous when endowments are real rather 
than hypothetical. We challenged this finding and argued more generally 
that by aggregating across subjects, valuable behavioral information may be 
lost. To substantiate this claim, we conducted hypothetical dictator game 
experiments and corresponding experiments played with actual money and 
partitioned the sample based on collected information on dictators' 
cognitive ability and five major personality traits. 
We concluded that the impact of incentives on dictators' generosity 
is much more complex than previously thought and in particular varies a 
great deal across individuals (making the often-used assumption of a 
fictitious average subject problematic). We were nonetheless successful in 
relating these individual differences to two of the five personality traits in 
the NEO five-factor inventory, agreeableness and extraversion. Extravert 
dictators conformed to the aforementioned evidence - generous whenever 
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when real dollars were at stake. However, the shift from fictional to real 
choices/dollars had a surprisingly different effect on kind, cooperative, 
unselfish, trustful, and generous experimental dictators. For these 
individuals, actual contributions exceeded the hypothetical ones. Agreeable 
dictators downplayed their contributions and revealed their true generosity 
only when their actions could really influence the well-being of potential 
recipients. 
In summary, we believe the contribution of this work is twofold. 
First, we provide additional evidence on the potential role of incentives in 
experimental setups, particularly emphasizing differences at the individual 
level. Second, we provide evidence on the economic significance of 
incorporating individual personality differences in order to better 
understand observed heterogeneities in individuals' choices. This 
corroborates recent successful attempts to link personality types to 
behavioral differences across decision-makers in various setups.  
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  16    A. Dictator Game Experiment with Money, for the 
'Sending-to-Male' Condition 
    Instructions for the Experiment 
  
The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory. No 
questions will be answered during this experiment. If you have any 
questions, you should read back through these instructions. Now that the 
experiment has begun, please do not talk at all.  
In this experiment you have been paired with a person. This person 
is in a different room from yours, room B. You will not be told who this 
person is either during or after the experiment. Your only information 
about this person is that he is also a participant in the experiment and that 
he is a male. 
The room in which you are seated is referred to in these instructions 
as room A. You will notice that there are other persons in the room who 
are also participating in this experiment. You have not been paired with 
any of these persons. Two persons in room A - room assistant 1 and room 
assistant 2 have been chosen to be the facilitators for today's experiment. 
The room assistants will be in charge of the envelopes as explained below. 
In addition, room assistant 1 and room assistant 2 will verify that the 
instructions have been followed as they appear here. 
In this experiment, persons in room A, yourself included, will have 
the opportunity to send in an envelope, some, all, or none of $10 to the 
person they have been paired with in room B. The person in room B then 
keeps the money sent to them. 
The remainder of these instructions will explain exactly how this 
experiment is run. The experiment is structured so that no one, including 
the experimenters and the room assistants, will know your personal 
  17decision. Since your decision is private, we ask that you not tell anyone 
your decision either during, or after, the experiment. 
The experiment is conducted as follows: Large envelopes were given 
to you upon entering the room today. Each of these large envelopes 
contains 4 envelopes. One of the envelopes is small and labeled 'money.' 
This envelope contains ten (10) one dollar bills and ten (10) blank slips of 
paper. You should now take out the envelope marked 'money.' Each 
person assigned to room A will be called, one at a time, by room assistant 
1. The person who was called will then go to one of the privacy stations 
and open the envelope privately inside the privacy station. 
Each person in room A must: 
    1)    First open the sealed envelope marked 'money.' You must 
decide how many dollar bills (if any) and how many blank slips of paper to 
leave in the small envelope which will be sent to the person you have been 
paired with. The number of dollar bills plus the number of slips of paper 
must add up to 10. You then keep the remaining dollar bills and slips of 
paper. The money you keep is yours to take from the experiment along 
with the $15 you receive for participating. Examples: (a) leave $2 and 8 
slips in the small envelope, keep $8 and 2 slips; (b) leave $9 and 1 slip in 
the small envelope, keep $1 and 9 slips. These are examples only, the 
actual decision is up to each person. Once you have made your decision 
regarding the money, you will seal the envelope inside the privacy station, 
and then place it in the box at the front of the room marked 'return 
envelopes.'  
    2)    You will then go back to your seat in the room and await 
further instructions from the experimenter. 
After all the small envelopes have been put in the return box, room 
assistant 2 will transport the box to a recorder, who is in the hallway. With 
room assistant 2 observing, the recorder will then, one at a time,  
  18    1)   open the envelope, 
    2)   record on a blank sheet of paper the number on the envelope 
and the amount of money in the envelope, and  
    3)    put the money back in the envelope and reseal it, and put the 
envelope back in the return box. 
At this point, room assistant 2 will take the return box to room B 
where the money will be distributed. The person you have been paired 
with is in room B. Each person in room B has also been asked to fill out 
the questionnaires and given $15 to participate. The money will be given to 
the appropriate person in room B.  
    At this stage, you will wait for an experimenter to come into the 
room and give you instructions as to what will happen next. For the 
moment, please note that your decision regarding the $10 in the small 
envelope is the only decision that you will be asked to make in this 
experiment. 
    SUMMARY: 
    1) You have been paired with a person from another room. That 
person is a male. 
    2) You need to decide how much of $10 you will send to this 
person. 
        3) Once you have made your decision regarding how much 
money to send, you should put the envelope in the box marked 'return 
envelopes,' return to your seat and await further instructions. 
    4) No participant in the experiment, including the person with 
whom you have been paired in Room B, the room assistants, and the 
experimenters, will know the decision made by you as an identifiable 
individual. You will not be told and will have no way of knowing the 
identity of the person in Room B with whom you have been paired. 
     
  19 B. Simulated Dictator Game Experiment without 
Money - Giving to a Variety of Types of Persons 
 
Imagine yourself in a situation in which you are given $10, which 
you can keep to yourself or give to another person, all or any portion of it. 
You may give money only in increment s of  $1.  W e  a r e  as ki n g  y ou  to 
consider giving money to different persons, one at a time. That is, each 
time you are given $10, which you can divide between yourself and another 
person. Each person is described in the table provided below. When 
making your decision, please consider only the information given on each 
line.  
Please imagine the situation to be as close as possible to a real-life 
situation. Remember, all of your answers are entirely anonymous and the 
researchers have no way of linking them to you or to anybody else in this 
experiment. 
Please indicate in the space provided the amount you give and the 
amount you keep; make sure that the amount given to the other person 
and the amount you keep for yourself add up to $10. 
Here are a few examples. Suppose that the other person is someone 
who listens to Broadway musicals - this is the only information you have 
about the other person. Assume that you decide to give $0, thus keeping 
$10. This decision should be recorded as indicated in the first line of the 
examples table shown below. Alternatively, suppose that the other person 
is your next-door neighbor (and that's all you know about this person), and 
you decide to give $2 and keep $8. This decision should be recorded as 
indicated in the second line of the examples table. As a final example, 
suppose that the other person is someone named James (again, this is the 
only information you have about the other person), and you decide to give 
  20$10 and keep $0. This decision should be recorded as indicated in the 
third line of the examples table.  
Examples table 
The other person…     Money you give to 
this person    
Money you keep to  
yourself     
      Total 
 
 Listens to Broadway musicals  $0  $10          $10 
 
Is your next door neighbor     $2  $8          $10 
Is named James     $10  $0          $10 
 
           
These are only hypothetical examples, and the decision how much 
to give is of course entirely yours.  
The experiment begins here. You have $10 that you can keep to 
yourself, or give to another person, all or any portion of it in increments of 
$1. Each line describes a different person. The only thing you know about 
this person is the information given on that line. Please consider each 
person separately. Write the amount of money you give to the other 
person and the amount to keep for yourself in the space provided. 
 
The other person…     Money you give to this 
person    
Money you keep to  
yourself     
      Total 
 
    Is from a small family                      $10 
 
    Listens to bluegrass music                     $10 
    Speaks English and additional 
languages          
           $10 
 
Was born and raised in MN                     $10 
  [many other characterizations follow]   
  21C. Simulated Dictator Game Experiment without 
Money - Giving to a Female 
 
Imagine yourself in a situation in which you can keep or give to 
another person, all or any portion of $10. This person is a female. You 
may give money only in increments of $1. For example, you can give $0 
and keep $10, or give $2 and keep $8, or give $8 and keep $2. These are 
only hypothetical examples, and the decision of how much to give is 
entirely yours. 
Please imagine the situation to be as close as possible to a real-life 
situation. Remember, all of your answers are entirely anonymous and the 
researchers have no way of linking them to you or to anybody else in this 
experiment. 
Your decision is to give $___ to this female and to keep $___ to 
yourself, for a total of $10. 




  Mean-"pay" SD–"pay"  Mean–"no-pay"  SD-"no-pay" 
Send  3.08  2.52   2.70   2.89 
Agreeableness   31.93  5.96   30.95   5.51 
Conscientiousness   30.59   6.45   31.13   6.18 
Extraversion   30.79   7.26   30.84   6.36 
Neuroticism   23.59   8.46   22.13   7.63 
Openness   31.77   6.39  29.32  6.49 
Cognition   28.34   5.76  28.16   5.71 
# Obs.  72   420 
 
The Table presents summary statistics on amounts sent by dictators in experiments with money 
("pay") and experiments without money ("no-pay"); raw scores dictators earned on NEO 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness scales; and raw 
scores earned on Wonderlic personnel test on problem-solving ability ("Cognition"). 72 (220) 
subjects participated in "pay" ("no pay") experiments. The number of observations for the NEO 
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Table 2 
Estimation Results 
  OLS    Ordered  Logit
Constant  5.750 
(0.159) 
 












No Pay Dummy x c  0.020 
 (0.725)  
0.020 
(0.573)  
















# Obs.    491 491 
Adjusted R-squared    0.082  
Pseudo R-squared     0.035 
The Table reports OLS and ordered logit estimation results of the model in 
Subsection 3.2. Transfers of experimental dictators are related to the dictator's gender (gender, 
1 for male dictators); raw scores dictators earned on NEO agreeableness (a), conscientiousness 
(c), extraversion (e), neuroticism (n), and openness (o) scales; and raw scores earned on 
Wonderlic personnel test on problem-solving ability (cog). The 'no pay' dummy equals 1 for 
hypothetical contributions. In addition to the variables reported in the Table, the estimated 
specifications include a control for the dictator's and recipient's gender, the five personality and 
cognitive ability variables, and their interaction with the dictator's gender.  The corresponding 
estimates are not reported here. The number of observations is 491 since we do not have 
gender information on one of the participants. Probabilities are in parentheses. 
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